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Standard economic theory assumes that agents’ valuation of economic outcomes is independent of the 
process via which these outcomes are produced. Yet Bulte, Gerking, List, and de Zeeuw (2005) found that 
causes in addition to outcomes matter in valuation. Using a field experiment I test whether drawing people’s 
attention to the role they play in the process of environmental degradation affects their willingness to pay 
for mitigation, and how this compares the activities undertaken by others. I do so by eliciting contributions 
to a reforestation program in an environmentally valuable area in Ethiopia. I implement three different 
conditions which allow me to measure the impact on contributions of emphasizing (i) the contributions of 
others to forest conservation, and (ii) the role of the respondents themselves in the forest degradation 
process. I find that learning about the efforts of others does not affect contributions while emphasizing the 
respondents’ negative role in the process actually increases contributions. Extant literature notes that 
including information on human-caused environmental damage in contingent valuation surveys does indeed 
increases the WTP values. This was, however, attributed to ‘outrage effect’ – that is, because respondents 
are upset, they contribute more to environmental goods. In a somewhat different setting this study finds 
evidence that people’s contributions also increase significantly and substantially if attention is drawn to 
their own responsibility in the deforestation and desertification process, suggesting, the ‘responsibility 
effect’ is also important in valuation. 
 
Key words: Valuation of the environment, incentive compatible valuation techniques, conservation, Field 
Experiment, Forestry, Public goods. 





 One of the key assumptions of standard economic theory is that agents attach value to 
(economic) outcomes, and not to the process by which the outcomes are generated (Sen, 1995). If 
this were the case, people’s willingness to financially contribute to the development of a cure for 
brain damage would be the same independent of whether accidents or excessive drinking are the 
main cause of the brain damage. Similar considerations would apply to the appreciation and/or 
provision of public goods as well – for example, whether the demise of a seal population is due to 
a natural disease or the consequence of fossil fuel extraction at sea, people’s willingness to pay for 
a seal regeneration project should be the same. In fact, Bulte et al. (2005) find that people’s 
willingness to pay (WTP) for a seal population recovery program is indeed higher when the demise 
of the species is due to human activity. They attribute this difference to a mechanism labeled as 
“outrage effect”, a term first coined by Kahneman, Ritov, Jacowitz, and Grant (1993) — people 
are more upset if they think the damage to the environment is caused by human activities they are 
not directly engaged in themselves.  
 In this paper, I extend the work by Bulte et al. (2005) by addressing the question of 
whether people’s willingness to pay for protecting the environment is also higher if not other 
humans but they themselves are at least partly responsible for the current (degraded) state of the 
environment. More specifically, I analyze whether people are more willing to contribute to an 
environmental good if their own role in the environmental degradation process is emphasized. I 
do so by eliciting contributions to a reforestation program among farmers in an environmentally 
valuable area, the Bale Eco-region in Ethiopia, by emphasizing that one of the activities that they 
engage in, logging, is one of the main causes of local forest loss.  
 Research on people’s preferences and environmental valuations is often difficult because 
there is no direct relationship between people’s preferences and their environmental behavior – 
people may have a strong preference for the environment but still decide not to undertake 
environmentally friendly actions. The difference between preferences and behavior may be the 
result of the environment being a public good. An individual engaging in environmentally friendly 
behavior incurs costs while her private benefits of the improved environmental outcome are 
typically small. Revealed preference techniques may thus not always be applicable, but 
unfortunately, survey methods to elicit valuation, the so-called stated preferences techniques, are 
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not without problems either. Hypothetical bias is one of the most important problems with stated 
preferences valuation techniques. If asked to value an item, people tend to overstate their true 
willingness to pay if they think that they will not actually be forced to financially contribute.  
 To mitigate this issue, I decided to financially incentivize farmers’ decision by (i) 
endowing them with a budget that is, in principle, theirs to keep, and (ii) subsequently asking them 
how much of their budget they are willing to invest in a local reforestation project. Asking farmers 
for their financial contribution implies that farmers will think carefully about their decision of how 
much to contribute. Step (ii) is implemented under three different conditions (using a between-
subjects design). The first condition is one in which respondents receive a full account regarding 
forest-related activities. The scenario in this condition provides information on the efforts of other 
countries in the region to protect the forest, and it also emphasizes the fact that small-scale logging 
is one of the main causes of local forest degradation. Information on the effort other countries 
undertake to protect the forest is left out in the scenario of the second condition. The difference in 
contributions between the first and the second condition allows me to infer whether efforts by 
others tend to result in a higher propensity to contribute (as the good example by others crowds in 
contributions) or whether this tends to invite more free-riding (as the perceived necessity to 
contribute oneself too may be lower if others already engage in forest conservation activities). 
Compared to that of the first condition, the scenario in the third condition leaves omits the 
emphasis of the role of logging by farmers as an important cause of forest loss which, in turn, 
causes desertification in the region. Comparing the outcomes of the first and the third condition 
allows me to infer whether an increased emphasis on one’s own personal role in the environmental 
degradation process tends to result in higher contributions, or not. I find that emphasizing the role 
of others does not affect contributions, while explicitly pointing out the (negative) role the 
respondents play actually increases contributions.  
Asking respondents to make actual contributions in a public good setting induces respondents to 
think more carefully about the problem they are confronted with, but it does so at the expense of 
underestimating the farmers’ true valuation of the forest. After all, the costs of contributing are 
private while the benefits accrue to all, and hence true willingness to pay (for example elicited in 
a binding referendum format) will likely be higher than observed willingness to pay. However, 
under the plausible assumption that the extent to which hypothetical versus factual payments affect 
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farmers’ WTP levels is the same in all three conditions, my study provides a careful test of the 
“responsibility effect” on willingness to pay – the fact that I find differences in farmers’ 
contributions between the various treatment arms indicates that also the farmers’ true valuation 
will vary between the three treatment arms.  
 The setup of my paper is as follows. In section 2, I discuss the issue of hypothetical bias 
in stated preference valuation techniques, and how I dealt with this issue in this study. In section 
3, I present the study’s hypotheses and experimental design. Section 4 includes the results of the 
experiment and further analysis using different tools. Finally, section 5 presents the conclusions.  
2. Valuation of Environmental Goods and Services 
 Environmental valuation is an important issue as the quantity and quality of nature and 
the environment directly affect people’s welfare – and especially the welfare of those people who 
are directly dependent on these natural resources (Dean & Hoeller, 1991). Nevertheless, 
environmental valuation is not straightforward owing to the typical nature of the public goods. 
Pure public goods have two characteristics. First, they are non-excludable – people cannot be 
excluded from the benefits these goods provide, not even if they themselves did not contribute to 
their provision. And second, their consumption is non-rival – one person’s consumption of the 
public good does not affect the extent to which others can benefit from it. Markets can provide 
information on people’s valuation of private goods, but the characteristics of non-excludability 
and non-rivalry in consumption implies that there are no naturally occurring markets for public 
goods (Richard T Carson, Flores, & Meade, 2001). Artificial markets for public goods, however, 
can be developed by using different valuation methods. 
 
 One such valuation method is the contingent valuation method (CVM), which was 
developed by Ciriacy-Wantrup (1947). CVM is, in essence, a survey method in which the 
respondent is provided with a description of a hypothetical public good provision program, like a 
bird protection project or an oil spill prevention program. The respondents are given detailed 
information on the benefits that the program will provide – the type of birds targeted, how they 
look like, their importance for maintaining the integrity of the ecosystem, etc. The scenario also 
specifies the increase in population size (or prevention of their decline) the program is expected to 
realize. After having provided this information, the respondent’s valuation of the project is elicited 
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– either by simply asking what the maximum amount of money is that she is willing to pay for the 
project to be implemented (so-called “open-ended bid elicitation”), or by asking the respondent 
whether she would be willing to pay a specific amount of money for the project’s implementation 
yes or no. The second type of question is often framed as a referendum (“if the project would 
require the imposition of a tax of $x, would you vote in favor of the project, yes or no?”) and is 
typically referred to as the dichotomous choice valuation approach (Adamowicz, Boxall, Williams, 
& Louviere, 1998; Mitchell & Carson, 1989). The demand function for the public good is then 
obtained by varying the amount to be paid – the higher the amount stated the lower the share of 
respondents who indicate that they would be willing to pay that amount. 
 Since its first application (Robert, 1963), the dichotomous choice valuation technique has 
become increasingly more popular (compared to the open-ended valuation approach); see 
(Freeman III, Herriges, & Kling, 2014; Haab, Interis, Petrolia, & Whitehead, 2013; Oerlemans, 
Chan, & Volschenk, 2016). The reason is that theoretically, the dichotomous choice approach is 
incentive compatible, in the sense that there is little reason to strategically misrepresent one’s 
preferences (by saying “yes” to a price offer that is above one’s true value or “no” to an offer that 
is below one’s true value). This is not necessarily the case in the open-ended versions, where 
respondents may strategically (grossly) under- or overstate their willingness to pay depending on 
whether they think that they will actually be forced to contribute the stated amount, or not 
implementation (Cummings, Elliott, Harrison, & Murphy, 1997; Taylor, 1998).  
 However, despite the mentioned advantage of dichotomous choice mechanism, 
experimental studies have found some unresolved issues with the mechanism. One issue is a 
disparity in valuation results between the hypothetical referendum and the real referendum 
(Cummings & Taylor, 1999; Hausman, 2012). It is often the case that in CV, the WTP elicited 
tend to be higher than in situations where the yes/no question has real consequences (with all 
respondents being forced to pay and the project being implemented if the majority votes in favor). 
Two of the main causes for this upward bias is that the hypothetical nature of the method invites 
socially desirable answers, while respondents may also fail to pay enough attention to the budget 
consequences of their answer (if the project had not been hypothetical). 
To address this issue, I decided to financially incentivize farmers’ decision to contribute to 
the public good – a reforestation project in their local forest. Whereas this decreases the farmers’ 
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propensity to provide socially desirable answers, it does so at the cost of underestimating their true 
willingness to pay. This can be seen as follows.  
Let 𝑞𝑖 denote community member’s contribution to the reforestation project – the number 
of trees she decides to have planted on her behalf. If there are n community members, the number 
of trees planted is 𝑄 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . From the community’s perspective there are local benefits to 
having more trees. Let us denote the local benefits accruing to community member i (improved 
soil protection, improved retaining of groundwater, etc.) with 𝐵𝑖 (𝑄) . Denoting community 
member i’s budget for tree planting with 𝐸𝑖 and the (constant) costs of financing planting a tree 
with 𝑐𝑖, community member i’s welfare associated with planting Q trees is equal to 
𝑤𝑖 = 𝐸𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖𝑞𝑖 + 𝐵𝑖 (∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ),                               (1) 
and the social welfare consequence of the community planting 𝑄(= ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) trees is  
𝑊 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = ∑ (𝐸𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖𝑞𝑖)
𝑛




𝑖=1 ).                            (2) 
Maximizing (2), the socially optimal number of trees planted by each community member is 
implicitly defined by 
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑞𝑖
= −𝑐𝑖 + ∑ 𝐵𝑖
′𝑛
𝑖=1 = 0.                                                                                (3) 
But if a community member does not attach any value to the benefits of planting trees accruing to 
his/her fellow community members, he/she maximizes (1), and hence his/her privately optimal 
number of trees planted is 
𝜕𝑤𝑖
𝜕𝑞𝑖
= −𝑐𝑖 + 𝐵𝑖
′ = 0.                                                                                             (4) 
Comparing (3) and (4) and noting that  ∑ 𝐵𝑖
′𝑛
𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝑖
′ + ∑ 𝐵𝑖
′ > 𝐵𝑖
′
𝑗≠𝑖 , it is clear that the privately 
optimal number of trees planted is smaller than the socially optimal number. 
 For this study, we financially incentivize community members to choose how many trees 
should be planted on their behalf. Unless all community members are pure altruists, our estimates 
of the marginal social value of trees are anywhere between 𝐵𝑖
′ and ∑ 𝐵𝑖
′𝑛
𝑖=1 , and hence may be a 
gross /underestimate of the (true) social value. With this approach, we trade off the benefits of a 
well thought-through financially incentivized decision at the cost of underestimating the true value. 
However, as we are interested in the treatment differences rather than in the levels themselves, we 
choose to financially incentivize private decision-making. Therefore, we do not estimate the true 
social value of trees. But we argue that if the framing affects the private decisions in a specific 




3. Context and Hypotheses 
 I hypothesize that the information about the efforts taken by others to promote forest 
conservation and reduce desertification will not affect respondents’ valuation of conservation 
activities (and also not their contributions), but that reminding them of their own role in the 
deforestation process will result in increased contributions. Previous studies have found that 
including the human-caused environmental damage information will increase WTP (Bulte et al., 
2005; R.T Carson et al., 2003). More specifically, Bulte et al. (2005) studied how different causes 
of environmental degradation (human vs. natural) affect WTP values. They found that people state 
a higher WTP when the cause of environmental damage is human activity. They attributed this 
difference to an “outrage effect” –people contribute more if they think the damage to the 
environment is caused by human activity because this makes them feel upset. Alternatively, the 
results may be due to a “responsibility effect.” People are willing to pay more if they think they 
themselves are (partly) responsible for the observed degradation (Brown, Peterson, Marc 
Brodersen, Ford, & Bell, 2005; Walker, Morera, Vining, & Orland, 1999).  
 In this study, I test whether such a “responsibility effect” also exists among farmers in 
Ethiopia’s Bale Eco-region (see below for more information). I do so using a financially-
incentivized experiment that elicited WTP for a public good, afforestation. Decisions thus have 
real financial contributions. Respondents receive an endowment of 50 ETB (which is only slightly 
less than a full day’s wage for unskilled labor). Respondents can pocket the money, but they can 
also spend it purchasing trees. Any tree purchased will be planted on their behalf. Having a tree 
planted on one’s behalf costs10 ETB. The contribution decision is about the number of trees 
planted on one’s behalf – any integer number between 0 and 5 trees. WTP thus takes six discrete 
values (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50). I use a between-subjects design, and hence participants make a 
decision of how much to contribute in one of the three scenarios.  
 All scenarios (treatments) present the same information on the background about the 
importance of environmental good provision (deforestation and desertification), the good provided 
(afforestation), the mode of payment and budget constraint, and finally, the question of WTP 
elicitation. Hence, all the surveys have the same background, good, and payment mechanism but 
differ in the information used as treatments in the experiment. The three treatments are the 
7 
 
following. The baseline treatment offers a scenario that, in addition to the information above, 
describes the efforts that neighboring countries are undertaking to prevent the problem, and it also 
explicitly draws attention to the role logging plays in the process of desertification and forest loss. 
Our respondents are small-scale farmers who engage in logging activities, and hence this scenario 
reminds them of their own responsibility in the process as well as of the activities of others to 
mitigate the problem. I call this the combined treatment. Compared to this first scenario, the second 
treatment condition omits the information about the respondents’ own responsibility, and hence 
only provides information on the conservation efforts by others. I call this treatment the effort 
elsewhere only treatment. Compared to the scenario in the first treatment, the third condition omits 
the effort elsewhere content and hence provides only the information on the role of logging in the 
deforestation and desertification process. I call this scenario the human-caused treatment. 
Comparing contributions in the first and the second treatment provides insights about whether 
information about efforts of other countries crowds in or crowds out contributions by our 
respondents. And comparing contributions in the first and the third treatment isolates the 
“responsibility effect”.  
 The scripts are as follows. The general information on the deforestation was as follows: 
 
“Desertification is the advance of deserts because the tree and plant cover that bind the 
soil is removed. It occurs when trees and bushes are stripped away for fuelwood and timber, 
or to clear land for cultivation. Desertification is a global issue, with serious implications 
worldwide for nature, wildlife, and agriculture. Some 50 million people in Ethiopia may 
be displaced within the next 10 years as a result of desertification.” 
 
 
And the willingness to pay question was framed as follows: 
“One effective mitigating measure is planting trees to change the non-forest land to forest 
and prevent deserts from expanding. 
Consider the benefits of planting trees in this region. Of the 50Birr you just received, how 
much do you wish to contribute to planting trees? For every 10Birr, we can plant 1 tree.  




The script regarding the role of small-scale logging activities was as follows: 
“There are different factors that are increasing deforestation. One important factor is 
illegal logging by different parties. The uncontrolled cutting of trees will eventually change 
the forest land to non-forest land. This will aid the gradual changing of the land to desert 
and to an unfavorable climate. The trees that are cut down by illegal loggers are used as 
fuel for cooking as well as being sold in the market to be used for furniture and construction 
purposes.” 
 
This script was included in the human-caused only and in the combined treatments, but not in the 
effort elsewhere only treatment. 
 The script regarding the efforts of other countries to prevent deforestation and 
desertification was as follows: 
“Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda have united their efforts to combat illegal timber trade in 
East Africa to decrease deforestation. These countries recognize that illegal logging must 
be mitigated and forests managed sustainably, in order to reduce emissions from forest 
loss. As such, a key goal of the initiative is to curb illegal logging and trade in East Africa 
as a way to address deforestation and subsequently reduce emissions from forests. 
Even though there are many international initiatives to curb deforestation, recent reports 
show that global efforts to curb deforestation are insufficient, as forests are cleared faster 
than ever for agribusiness, timber, and other land development schemes. However, there 
was an important call made for a change in policy to deal with the problem.”  
 
This script was included in the effort-elsewhere and in the combined treatments, but not in the 
human-caused only treatment. 
I now explicitly state the hypotheses that will be tested in this study: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Drawing respondents’ attention to the role of illegal logging in the process of 
deforestation and desertification increases their contributions to the reforestation project offered. 





Hypothesis 2: Informing respondents that other countries recognize the role of illegal logging and 
actively try to discourage it induces respondents to raise their contributions to the reforestation 
project. Average contributions are higher in the combined treatment than in the human-caused only 
treatment. 
 
4. Field, Randomization, Recruitment, and Experimental Procedure 
The context of the study is the Bale Mountains Eco-region in Ethiopia. The Bale Mountains 
Eco-region is the second largest standing moist tropical forest in Ethiopia (Defries et al., 2002). 
The Afro-alpine region provides habitat for numerous endemic species, marking the region as one 
of the 34 globally recognized biodiversity hotspots (Williams et al., 2005). More than 12 million 
people depend on the water that originates from the mountains. The dry lowlands of the east and 
southeast of Ethiopia (including neighboring Somalia and parts of Northern Kenya) get their 
perennial water only from water that springs from the mountains in the Eco-region. This region 
was selected as a study area for three reasons. First, it is of considerable economic importance for 
Ethiopia –its direct consumptive use value alone was estimated to be in billions of dollars per year 
(Watson, 2007). Second, it is a priority forest area selected for conservation, in light of its 
importance for neighboring countries and the surrounding communities. Finally, it covers the 
largest area of Afro-alpine forests in the African continent (100,000ha) and is registered as a world 
heritage area by UNESCO. 
 
The sample in this study is taken from Dodola “Woreda” (the lower administration level 
next to regional administration), out of which three villages were selected: Bura-Adelle, Kechema, 
and Geneta (see Figure 1). These villages were selected because they were among the first to 
implement forest management in the Bale Eco-region, and they are more accessible in terms of 





Figure 1: Map of the study area. 
 
 
 The experiment was implemented in January 2016 in the three villages. Every treatment 
was implemented in each of the three villages, and respondents participated in just one treatment. 
In total 96 individuals participated in this study. The subjects were invited via the village-level 
administration agents to come to the meeting places. Inviting subjects to the meeting via village 
administration agents is not unusual in the study area. Village-level meetings are a common 
occurrence in which various issues are discussed on a regular basis. Hence, it is unlikely that the 
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village administration’s assigned person would disseminate systematically biased information to 
recruit certain types of individuals only.1 Hence, the subjects in this study are likely to be a fairly 
representative sample of the people living in the three villages.  
 
 Upon arrival of the subjects to the meeting place, the experimenters gave a brief 
explanation of the research project and the researcher’s background. Next, subjects undertook two 
tasks in the field. The first task was filling out a general survey which was administered to collect 
the background information on the subjects. Experimenters collected this information individually 
from the subjects in the form of an interview.  
 The second task was the implementation of the WTP elicitation experiment. Subjects 
were assigned to one of three treatment groups. Note that the within-village treatment allocation 
helps mitigate concerns of unobserved heterogeneity affecting treatment outcomes. Next, research 
assistants read out the script aloud to each treatment group. Reading of scripts to each treatment 
group was done such that participants in the one group were not able to overhear what was being 
said in another group. Furthermore, the subjects made the decision individually after being 
approached by the experimenters in the form of an interview. Finally, based on their decision the 
money was immediately collected, and the trees were planted seven months later, i.e. July 2016).  
5. Results  
5.1. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of responder characteristics in the three treatments, as well 
as the outcomes of the relevant balance tests. The subject pools are found to differ in some respects. 
In the combined treatment the share of male participants is lower than in the other two treatments. 
However, it should be noted that differences in female participants across treatments are small in 
magnitude. For example, the third treatment group contains only 3 women more compared to the 
other two treatments. Similarly, the membership in local collaborative forest management (CFM) 
groups differ somewhat across the treatments. The subjects of this experiment are also people who 
                                                     
1 This is also because, given that the government already initiated a “5 households in one group” culture of working 
together, information disseminates very fast. Thus, it is less probable that certain households would be systematically 
sent to attend a meeting and others excluded, as this might damage the future relationships in the villages. 
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care about the environment and take the seriousness of environmental degradation into 
consideration. This opinion does not differ across treatments, as can be seen from the variable 
Opinion on climate change.  
 






Combination p-value  
Income 3506.284 3504.650 3807.793 0.899 
  (423.767) (529.497) (547.556) 
 
Land Size 2.268 2.581 2.544 0.674 
  (0.293) (0.252) (0.273) 
 
Age (>25) 1.000 0.947 1.000 0.215 
  (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) 
 
Education (1-5) 0.677 0.447 0.519 0.159 
  (0.085) (0.082) (0.098) 
 
Family size (>5) 0.742 0.658 0.667 0.734 
  (0.080) (0.078) (0.092) 
 
Male 0.935 0.974 0.778 0.022 
  (0.045) (0.026) (0.082) 
 
CFM member 0.774 0.526 0.667 0.099 











N 31 38 27 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Orthogonality outcomes are based on F-tests on the 
variable distributions across the three treatment arms.  
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5.2. Experimental Results 
 
 Table 2 presents the mean contribution (or WTP) as well as results of pairwise comparison tests 
of the mean contributions across the three treatment groups. Subjects in the human-caused only 
treatment have the highest mean WTP value (19.03ETB), while those in effort-elsewhere treatment 
have the lowest mean WTP value of 10.78ETB. The mean WTP value of combination treatment 
is 18.14ETB.  
Table 2. WTP by treatment group 

















Effort-elsewhere vs. Combination  0.0041 
Standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis overall difference test indicates a statistically significant difference between 
the three treatment groups (p = 0.0097). The difference in means across treatments is tested using 
Mann-Whitney U tests. I find that mean contributions are significantly lower in the effort 
elsewhere only treatment than in the combined treatment (p = 0.0041). I thus find support for 
Hypothesis 1: compared to just being informed of efforts undertaken in other countries, additional 
information on the role of illegal logging in the region results in a significant and substantial 
increase in contributions. Next, contributions are not significantly affected by information on the 
efforts of neighboring countries to combat the problem. Average contributions are slightly higher 
in the human-caused only than in the combined treatment (albeit not significantly so, as the p-value 
is 0.457). This suggests that, if anything, information on efforts elsewhere tend to crowd out (rather 




The distribution of WTP across the treatment groups can be seen from Figure 1, which presents 
the histograms of WTP by treatment and for all treatments together (Figure 1d). As noted before, 
the WTP is a discrete variable taking values within the range of 0 to 50 ETB, with step size 10. 
The overall distribution of subjects’ WTP shows a right-skewed distribution (Figure 1d) similar to 
other WTP studies (Green, Jacowitz, Kahneman, & McFadden, 1998; Gunatilake & Tachiri, 2014; 
Kanninen, 2007; Martín-Fernández et al., 2014). Some participants have WTPs below 10 ETB 
(including zero). The majority of subjects’ WTP values lie within the interval between 10 and 20 
ETB. The distribution of WTP values, however, differs across the treatment groups.  
 
Figure 1. Histograms of WTPs by Treatment. 
 
 
In human-caused only treatment (panel a), the WTP shows more variation across the discrete 









0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50
Human-caused Treatment      (a) Effort-elsewhere Treatment       (b)










other hand, the distribution of WTP values in the effort-elsewhere only treatment is less varied. 
The shape of the WTP distribution in this treatment is quite unimodal. Hence, the WTP of most 
participants in this treatment is very close to the others (about 60 percent have a WTP value of 
10ETB). Finally, the distribution in the combination treatment indicates some variation. About 50 
percent of subjects have WTP within the range of 10 to 20 ETB, with a positive distribution. 
 In general, the histograms suggest that the WTP values vary more in the human-caused 
only treatment and the combination treatment compared to the treatment of effort-elsewhere only. 
 
5.3. Econometric Analysis 
The observed treatment differences are also explored using regression analysis, which allows for 
conditioning on covariates, in order to control for concerns about the impact of possible differences 
in the subject pools. Utilizing regression will furthermore help us test the construct validity of our 
CV surveys. To take into consideration the discrete nature of the dependent variable, the model is 
estimated using interval as well as ordered probit regression techniques. The ordered probit 
regression in this study serves as a robustness check given the weak normality of the dependent 
variable (revealed by the Shapiro-Wilk test), which is assumed by interval regression. The 
regression equation is specified by equation (5):  
 
WTPij = β0  + β1 TrHumanCauseOnlyij+ β2 EffortElsewhereOnlyij  + β3 Xij  + εij.  (5) 
 
WTP values are regressed on treatment variables to extract treatment effects on individual i in 
village j, which are (β1, β2). β0  captures the average contribution in the combined treatment – the 
omitted category. The baseline treatment in our case is the effort-elsewhere only treatment. Finally, 
β3 captures the subject-specific characteristics, such as the subjects’ age, educational status, 
gender, income, land size, family size, and membership of environmental conservation groups. 
 
Table 3 shows the factors that influence contributions to the reforestation project. All 
specifications include village fixed effects. The omitted category of the treatment indicators is the 
combined treatment; the coefficients on human-caused only and effort elsewhere only treatment 
dummies thus indicate the impact of omitting “effort elsewhere” and “own responsibility” 
information, respectively. Columns 1 and 2 of the table indicate the treatment effects without 
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including other explanatory variables using OLS and interval regression, respectively. Consistent 
with the non-parametric tests presented in Table 2, I find that omitting information on effort 
elsewhere does not affect outcomes (as the coefficient on human-caused only is not significantly 
different from zero), but that the responsibility effect is substantial (as the coefficient on the effort 
elsewhere only treatment dummy is negative and significantly different from zero).  
 
Controlling for participants’ characteristics (columns 3 and 4), under both interval and ordered 
probit regressions, does not really affect the above estimated coefficients. However, the 
explanatory variables can be utilized as a test of construct validity. Construct validity is typically 
tested to examine whether or not the CVM captures preferences of people in the valuation (by 
looking at whether the correlation of economic variables such as cost and income with WTP value 
is as expected in standard economic principles). In Table 3, the economic variable, income of 
participants, seems to predict WTP values consistent with the standard expectation – that is, the 
higher the income, the higher the WTP values, and this relationship is significantly different from 
zero. 
 
Table 3: Factors affecting contributions to the reforestation project. 






















     











     
Gender   -0.886 -0.355 
   (2.260) (0.348) 




Age (>25 yrs)   -10.92*** -2.374*** 
   (3.067) (0.713) 
Income   0.000847** 0.000114** 
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   (0.000373) (0.0000509) 
Land Size   -0.495 -0.0793 
   (0.904) (0.123) 
CFM member   4.418** 0.591** 
   (2.081) (0.287) 
Village FE YES YES YES YES 
Constant 9.921*** 4.315** 10.75**  
 (1.599) (1.677) (4.331)  
Lnsigma     
Constant  2.166*** 2.090***  
  (0.112) (0.116)  




0.379 -120.523 -114.417 0.3090 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Note: Column 1 presents OLS with the dependent variable WTP. Columns 2 and column 3present 
the interval regressions. The additional variables were included in column 4, which presents 
ordered probit regression of WTP on treatments with the additional explanatory variables.  
 
 
The regressions also indicate other participant-specific predictors of the WTP values. For instance, 
the older participants are more likely to have lower WTP values compared to the younger ones 
(less than 25 years of age), and the same holds for below-average educated participants (although 
not significantly so). 
 
Another interesting point is that being engaged in local collaborative forest conservation shows a 
positive correlation with WTP. In the study area, it is possible to engage in forest conservation 
with a group called a collaborative forest management group (CFM). This is a local conservation 
group that looks after the surrounding forest. Hence, the positive correlation sign of CFM 
membership and WTP in the regression is expected since the members are contributors to the 
public good. I also ran regressions testing whether the treatment effects differ between CFM 
members and non-CFM members. None of these interaction effects are found to be different from 
zero, and hence they are not included in this table. 
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6. Aggregate WTPs and Robustness Checks 
Reforestation provides a public good, and hence total willingness to pay is the sum of individual 
willingness to pays. I estimate the implications of the treatments for total willingness to pay using 
survival functions. Setting WTP responses as a survival function means that, instead of the original 
notion of “time,” survival is defined by all the possible amounts (payments) that the respondents 
can contribute to the project. A respondent with positive willingness to pay “survives” that amount 
and a respondent with no willingness to pay “fails” that amount. Here, the log likelihood function 
is calculated by the difference in WTP densities evaluated at contributions of 0, 10, 20, 30, 40 and 
50 ETB. The likelihood function can then be maximized based on the selected parametric 
distribution (shape) such as in a standard Kaplan-Meier and Weibull estimator. Setting data into a 
survival function format mitigate the discrete nature of the WTP values (predicts the probability 
that true values are within the discrete values). A further advantage of utilizing this function is that 
the survival analysis is in line with the assumption of the key economic theory that the cost for the 
fraction of participants with positive WTP decreases monotonically (R.T Carson et al., 2003).  
 
 Hence, in this study, the Kaplan-Meier survival curve is used to present the summary 
measure of people’s WTP under the three treatments (Figure 2). Given the right-skewed nature of 
WTP – that is, there seem to be individuals who are not willing to contribute – mean summary for 
welfare analysis might not be the correct representation. Hence, the demand for the environmental 
good under the three treatments is compared with the 50th quintile of the graph. As can be seen 
from Figure 2, the human-caused only treatment appears to have a higher survival rate than the 
other two treatments. Looking at the median survival time, which is the probability of survival at 
0.5, the effort elsewhere only treatment appears to give 10 ETB versus about 20 ETB in the other 
two treatments. 






6.1. Robustness Check: Estimators of WTP 
I assess the role of covariates in the survival analysis using Weibull regression. In this model, the 
hazard measures risks faced by respondents in terms of failure (not paying). Accordingly, a higher 
hazard rate was associated with lower WTP values. In Weibull regression, since the reported 
coefficients of covariates are in the form of exp (βi), interpretation of the hazard rate requires 
transforming the coefficient to exp (βi) -1. Weibull regression results are reported in Table 4 below, 
which shows hazard increasing over the cost values (a positive sign of Weibull parameter ρ=2.90). 
That is, an increase in value by 10 ETB increases the likelihood of not leaving the lower WTP 
interval. As the values of WTP increase, the participants are less likely to pay more.  
Table 4.  
 WTP 
(Hazard ratio reported) 
  




























0 10 20 30 40 50
analysis time

















CFM member 0.639* 
 (0.169) 
Village FE YES 
N 85 
Weibull parameter (ρ) 2.90 
(0.235) 
    Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 4 shows and confirms that several explanatory variables are significant predictors of WTP 
decisions. For instance, being an older participant increases the hazard rate by more than 4 times 
over being a younger participant. That is, older participants are 4 times more likely not to leave 
the lower interval of WTP values. Being a CFM member decreases hazard by 36% (0.627-1). Thus, 
a member is 36% less likely to stay in the lower interval, which indicates that CFM members have 
higher WTP than non-CFM members. Table 4 also shows that one ETB increase in income results 
in a zero hazard rate (1-1). This is to say, for one ETB increase, the hazard rate will stay constant. 
Hence, the economic variable seems to predict the WTP decision.  
 
Furthermore, the role of treatments as shown by the Weibull regression similar to the results in the 
main finding mentioned before. In Table 4, the treatment coefficients show that being in the 
treatment group of effort-elsewhere only increases the hazard rate by more than 3 times compared 
to the baseline treatment (i.e., combination). That is, being offered the effort-elsewhere only 
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scenario decreases WTP. In general, despite the assumption of a specific shape parameter in the 
Weibull regression, the results in this regression are consistent with the main findings (Table 3).  
7. Conclusions 
The contingent valuation method was designed to elicit preferences for environmental goods for 
which conventional markets are unavailable (R.T Carson et al., 2003; Hanemann, 1994). I By 
allowing the attachment of monetary values to environmental goods, CV creates conventional 
market-like decision-making. In this study, we see evidence for this claim – that is, the creation of 
market-like behavior by CV – from the preferences of the subjects. Specifically, the relationship 
between the predictors and WTP values shows evidence of the subjects’ preference for 
environmental goods. First, the economic variables seem to be in line with the standard economic 
theory that the higher the income the higher the WTP of participants. Second, other predictors such 
as being a cooperative member of a local forest conservation seem to be correlated with higher 
WTP values.  
 
This study tests the hypothesis of whether drawing attention to owns involvement of human-caused 
environmental damages increase the WTP estimates. I do so by offering respondents in Ethiopia’s 
Bale Eco-region the opportunity to contribute to a reforestation project, using three different 
scenarios. All scenarios describe the issue of deforestation and desertification that is affecting the 
region. In one scenario additional information is provided that illegal logging plays a major role 
in this process, in another additional information is provided about the efforts other countries are 
undertaking to mitigate this problem of illegal logging; the third scenario offers both these types 
of information. Next I analyze how the contributions to the reforestation projects differ between 
the three different scenarios. This approach is akin to the contingent valuation method, which was 
designed to elicit preferences for environmental goods (R.T Carson et al., 2003; Hanemann, 1994). 
My approach differs from this method by asking respondents to make real financial contributions. 
Asking for real contributions makes decisions consequential and makes sure that respondents will 
think hard about how much they are willing to provide, and hence mitigates the  effect of providing 
socially desired answers. Indeed, economic variables seem to predict contributions in a way that 
is in line with the standard economic theory; the higher the income the higher contributions made 
by the participants. Also, other predictors such as being a cooperative member of a local forest 





Extant literature notes that including information on human-caused environmental damage in 
contingent valuation surveys increases the WTP values. This was, however, attributed to outrage 
effect – that is, because respondents are upset, they contribute more to environmental goods. In a 
somewhat different setting this study finds evidence that contributions to a reforestation project by 
respondents who are implicated in the process of environmental degradation are not affected by 
information on efforts of others to mitigate the problem, but also that their contributions increase 
significantly and substantially if attention is drawn to their own responsibility in the deforestation 
and desertification process. 
 
The responsibility effect increases contributions for two reasons. First, the sample pool of this 
study consists of participants who potentially engage in human-caused damage. In this case, the 
responsibility effect can be reinforced by including information on human-caused damage. 
Second, the majority of participants have a strong belief that the current environmental damage is 
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